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Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 11/28/03
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame 600-650 lb,
   Nebraska Auction Wght. Avg . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt . . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, hd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vacuum Packed Pork Loins, Wholesale,  
   13-19 lb, 1/4" Trim, Cent. US, cwt . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$72.96
     *
93.04
111.10
31.50
     *
83.26
84.87
164.35
$103.34
98.96
109.12
157.83
35.50
       *
88.68
89.62
180.50
$101.70
98.00
112.01
154.78
36.25
        *
87.73
        *
180.58
Crops,
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
     *
2.31
     *
4.76
2.14
3.58
2.34
7.79
4.63
1.59
3.96
2.38
7.46
4.67
1.52
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . .
150.00
80.00
117.50
130.00
 62.50
       *
130.00
61.50
        *
* No market.
Organic agriculture is one of the fastest growing industries
in the United States (U.S.). Organic food sales are growing at
a rate of more than 20 percent annually, totaling $7.8 billion
in 2000 [1].1 Advocates of the recently introduced national
organic standards predict that their introduction will further
enhance the growth of the organic sector. 
The process for the establishment of national organic
standards dates back to the late 1980’s when the organic sector
started lobbying for their introduction. In 1990, Congress
passed the Organic Foods Production Act mandating the
USDA to establish regulations for the organic sector [2]. The
National Organic Program (NOP), a marketing program of the
USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, developed national
organic standards and established an organic certification
program after a decade long debate involving producers,
processors, retailers, consumers, environmentalists, scientists
and certifying agents. The new national organic standards of
the NOP were finally specified in 2000 and were to be fully
implemented by 2002.
One of the main objectives of the NOP is to “assure
consumers that agricultural products marketed as organic meet
consistent and uniform standards” [2]. Organic food products
are what economists call credence goods, that is, consumers
are unable to observe the process though which the product
was produced even after the product’s consumption. Because
of the credence nature of organic food products, consumers
have to rely on product labels as their primary source of
information regarding the nature of the product. In this
environment, the clearer the content of the label, the more
potent is the signal conveyed through it. Prior to the establish-
ment of national organic standards, there was uncertainty as to
what the organic label implied about the nature of the product
bearing it. In part, the uncertainty involved the presence or
absence of genetically modified (GM) ingredients and/or any
form of genetic engineering in the production of a product
labeled “organic.” 
1 In sharp contrast, the conventional grocery industry grows by 3 to 5
percent annually. 
The new national organic standards removed this uncer-
tainty by explicitly specifying the methods, practices and
substances that should be used in the production of agricul-
tural products labeled and sold as organic. According to the
NOP regulations, all natural (non-synthetic) substances are
allowed in organic production and handling, and all synthetic
substances, genetic engineering, ionizing radiation and sewage
sludge are prohibited [2].
The introduction of the NOP is expected to have impor-
tant implications for the organic sector as well as for the GM
and conventional food sectors. The reason is that the NOP has
explicitly linked the markets for organic and GM food
products through the provision that food labeled as organic
should be GM-free. It should be noted that due to the alleged
“substantive equivalence” between GM products (GMPs) and
their conventional counterparts, there is no mandatory labeling
of GMPs in the U.S. Conventional and GM products are
marketed together as a non-labeled product. Given the
inability of the American consumer to observe the nature of
the non-labeled product (GM versus conventional) under the
current no labeling regime, purchase of organic-labeled food
provides the only option available to consumers averse to
GMPs. In effect, the new national organic standards have
made the organic label equivalent to a “GM-free” label.
In a recent study the effect of the NOP on consumer
purchasing decisions and welfare under no labeling of GMPs
was examined. A simple model was developed to account for
differences in consumer willingness to pay for products with
different levels of interventions in their production process.
The analysis focused on processed food products, where both
the physical characteristics and the process attributes of the
available products (i.e., organic, GM and conventional) are
indistinguishable to consumers. In such a case, consumers
must rely entirely on product labels for informed consumption
decisions. 
Analytical results showed that the nature and magnitude
of the market and welfare effects of the NOP depend on the
level of consumer aversion to interventions in the production
process, the market share of the GM product in the total
production of the non-labeled product (which determines the
probability that the non-label product consumed will be GM),
the level of consumer uncertainty regarding the content of the
organic label prior to the NOP, and the distribution of con-
sumer preferences and the effect of the NOP on the price of
the organic product. 
The results suggest that as long as there is no price
increase in the organic product due to the NOP, the introduc-
tion of national organic standards will result in an unambigu-
ous increase in both the market share of the organic sector and
aggregate consumer welfare. The magnitude of this increase
will be greater, the greater the level of consumer aversion to
GMPs, the market share of GMPs in the production of the
non-labeled product, and the level of consumer uncertainty
regarding the organic label prior to the NOP. The increase in
aggregate consumer welfare results from an increase in the
utility of two different consumer groups. The first group
includes consumers with intermediate levels of aversion to
interventions in the production process who switch their
consumption to the organic product as a result of the NOP.
The second group includes consumers with relatively high
levels of aversion to interventions in the production process,
who both before and after the NOP consume the organic-
labeled product but receive greater utility after the NOP
knowing that the organic label is a GM-free label. 
The introduction of the NOP, however, could result in
higher certification and segregation costs for the organic
sector due to the requirement that products labeled “organic”
must be GM-free. In this case, if the higher costs are passed on
to consumers through higher product prices, then the market
and welfare effects of the NOP are ambiguous. For relatively
high price increases and small enhancement in utility from the
consumption of the organic product (due to low levels of
consumer aversion to GMPs and/or low consumer uncertainty
regarding the organic label prior to the NOP), the NOP is
shown to benefit the conventional and GM sectors by reducing
the market share of the organic product while causing con-
sumer welfare to fall. Interestingly, under certain combina-
tions of price increases and utility enhancement values, while
the NOP causes the market share of the organic product to fall,
it causes aggregate consumer welfare to rise. This outcome
occurs when the welfare loss incurred by consumers who
switch their consumption from the organic to the non-labeled
product (due to the higher price of the organic product after
the NOP), is smaller than the welfare gain realized by consum-
ers with high levels of aversion to GM products (who are now
assured of the GM-free nature of the organic-labeled food). 
Overall, the effect of NOP on the market share of the
organic sector and aggregate consumer welfare is sensitive to
the price effect of the certification and segregation costs
required in assuring the GM-free nature of organic-labeled
food. As long as the increase in the price of organic-labeled
food is not significant, the new national organic standards are
expected to have a positive impact on both the growth of the
organic sector and aggregate consumer welfare. 
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Note: The article is based on Yiannaka, A. “The Market and
Welfare Effects of the New National Organic Program” in
Marketing Trends for Organic Food in the Advent of the 21st
Century published by World Scientific, (in press).
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